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Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
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academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
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experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
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Abstract 
 
This study aimed to uncover the factors that influence Value Added Tax (VAT) 
compliance. Small businesses from the catering and flooring/furnishing trades in the 
United Kingdom were sent a questionnaire designed to elicit their views on VAT and 
related issues. Responses were obtained from 359 businesses. Results showed that VAT 
compliance in small businesses shares a number of similarities with private income tax 
compliance: Social norms, equity, economic factors and personality are all important in 
predicting compliance. 
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VAT compliance in the United Kingdom 
Paul Webley1, Caroline Adams2 and Henk Elffers3 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last fifteen years there has been a considerable amount of research into tax 
compliance (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998). Many new models of the compliance 
process have been devised and there has been a wide range of empirical studies. But the 
focus of nearly all of this research has been personal income tax compliance: business tax 
evasion in general and Value Added Tax (VAT) compliance in particular have received 
very little attention (Murray, 1995: interesting exceptions are Adams, 1996; Gordon & 
Nielsen, 1997; Hite, 1991; Murray, 1995, Roberts & McGill, 1991). This is surprising 
given the economic and social importance of business taxation and the fact that VAT has 
been introduced in a large number of countries (most recently China - Yeh, 1997 - and 
those countries in Central and Eastern Europe applying for membership of the European 
Union - Cnossen, 1998). It is difficult to get an accurate picture, but it is clear from the few 
studies that have been published that VAT evasion is widespread and involves significant 
revenue losses, though the extent varies considerably across countries. Agha and Haughton 
(1996) summarise the findings of studies from five countries in Europe and two in Asia: 
their figures suggest that revenue losses vary from a low of 3% (France, United Kingdom) 
to a high of 40% (Italy). Even the low figure represents a huge sum of money (three billion 
dollars for France) and a very high proportion of firms involved in some non-compliance. 
Duverne (1990), for instance, reports that 66% of French VAT taxpayers audited had 
understated the value of taxable sales (a quarter of them fraudulently) and 40% had 
overstated the value of taxable inputs. Similarly a study of Dutch businesses found that 
34% of firms had evaded VAT (Cnossen, 1981). All of these studies involve official 
figures: there have, to our knowledge, been no studies which have studied VAT 
compliance by asking businesses directly about their actions and no studies which have 
looked at the role played by psychological and social variables. 
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In the absence of studies on the causes of VAT non-compliance, we can draw on the 
economic psychological literature into income tax evasion (for example, Cowell, 1992; 
Elffers, 1991; Lewis, 1982; Webley, Robben, Elffers & Hessing, 1991) to identify what are 
likely to be the most important explanatory factors. Five factors seem likely to be 
particularly crucial: sanctions and punishments (deterrence), equity, personality, 
satisfaction with the tax authorities and mental accounting. Each will be considered in turn.  
 
Economic models clearly predict that higher penalties and audit probabilities should 
discourage non-compliance. The evidence suggests that though both have some deterrence 
effect (Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998), higher audit probabilities probably have more 
impact than higher penalties (Hessing, Elffers, Robben & Webley, 1992). The results of 
several surveys have indicated that self-reported non-compliers are less likely than 
compliers to believe that such acts would result in apprehension and punishment (Hessing, 
Elffers & Weigel, 1988). Nothing is known about what people running small businesses 
believe about the sanctions for VAT non-compliance. It must be remembered that 
deterrence is not solely a matter of legal sanctions: a belief that one’s reputation may suffer 
as a result of being caught evading is also a deterrent and this may be particularly relevant 
in a business context. 
 
The perceived fairness of a tax system is important both to its acceptability and smooth 
functioning. A recent example of how an unacceptable tax system impacts on the public 
consciousness is the saga of the poll tax in Britain (Cullis, Jones & Morrisey, 1993). A tax 
can be seen as unfair in a number of ways: if those of similar incomes are taxed differently, 
for example or if the government is seen as giving little back in return. Cowell (1992) has 
shown that how a person perceives his own role in influencing the perceived inequity is of 
central importance and it has been argued that a taxpayer may withdraw from the exchange 
relationship by evading taxes in order to offset or reduce the disparity. Although such 
research has looked almost exclusively at the private individual, recent work by Adams 
(1996) showed that perceived inequity in the taxation system was found to be the most 
important variable predicting non-compliance in those running small businesses in 
Holland. Furthermore in a recent qualitative study on VAT and small businessmen and 
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women (see Adams & Webley, 2001) the idea that small businesses in particular carry an 
unfair burden was a recurrent theme. 
 
Weigel, Hessing and Elffers (1998) suggest that some individuals may be characterised by 
egoistic tendencies, whilst others may exhibit a strong identification with community 
responsibilities, and thus be less motivated to avoid taxes owed. In other words, the more 
egoistic an individual, the less likely he or she will be to comply with rules and laws when 
compliance conflicts with their interests. There is a good deal of evidence that egoism 
(Weigel, Hessing & Elffers, 1998) predicts rule-breaking in a number of areas, including 
income tax evasion (Elffers, 1991), social security fraud (Hessing et al., 1993) and parking 
violations (Adams & Webley, 1996).  
 
Dissatisfaction with the tax authorities in other ways has also been suggested by a number 
of investigators as motivators to avoid taxation (for example, Elffers, 1991; Wallschutzky, 
1984; Wärneryd & Walerud, 1982). What evidence there is suggests that believing the 
system to be inefficient correlates positively with a propensity to evade (Vogel, 1974; 
Wearing & Heady, 1995). 
 
How business people think about the VAT money they collect may also influence their 
behaviour towards it: the notion of mental accounting (see Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) may be 
helpful here. Mental accounting is often described as a psychological mechanism whereby 
income is framed (Winnett & Lewis, 1995). Shefrin and Thaler (1988) propose, in respect 
of personal finance, that people have a number of mental accounts that operate 
independently of one another. What is interesting in the current context is whether business 
men and women psychologically separate monies owed to the VAT into a separate mental 
account from that of business turnover. If they do not, they may be more likely to try to 
evade VAT as a result of seeing it as ‘their’ money. 
 
The purpose of the present study was to build on previous research into income tax 
evasion, first, to provide a descriptive account of small business people’s views on VAT 
and related issues and second, to see if those social psychological factors which play an 
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important causal role in income tax evasion are also relevant to VAT. Two business sectors 
(catering; flooring and furnishing retailers) were investigated as there is some confidential 
evidence that the first group is generally less compliant with regards to VAT than the 
second. 
 
Method 
 
Sample 
 
The sample consisted of the names and addresses of business owners with a turnover of 
less than one million in the South West of England and the Midlands active as of the end of 
April 1997. The businesses were classified as either catering (licensed restaurants, 
unlicensed restaurants and cafes, take-away food shops) or flooring/furnishing retailers. A 
random sample of 1600 of each type of business was selected; thus 3200 questionnaires 
were distributed in total. Three hundred and fifty-nine responses were received. 
 
Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire was primarily quantitative but with some questions that were in an open 
format. The questionnaire was divided into seven sections described below. 
 
General Information 
 
Both personal and business related information was requested. This included, among other 
things, ‘age’, ‘gender’, ‘main business activity’, ‘number of staff employed’, the year the 
business was first registered for VAT and questions about the use of an outside advisor, 
penalties for late payment of VAT and the number of times the business had been 
inspected by the tax authorities. Respondents were also asked an open-ended question, ‘As 
a result of an inspection someone in your line of business has been found to have 
unintentionally declared less VAT than he or she legally owed. What do you think would 
happen?’ 
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You, the tax authorities and VAT 
 
This consisted of nine questions, all answered on a five-point scale from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree. The questions focused on the service provided by the authorities and 
general questions about VAT (for example, about its fairness, whether VAT money is seen 
as coming from business funds, about the prevalence of VAT fraud). 
 
You and other people  
 
This section comprised twelve questions from the egoism scale. This has an alpha of over 
0.80 (Weigel, Hessing & Elffers, 1998). 
 
You and VAT compliance 
 
This consisted of 16 questions, all answered on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. The questions dealt with a range of compliance issues, from the ease of 
making unintentional mistakes, through the acceptability of VAT rules and the detectability 
of VAT fraud both by other businesses and by the tax authorities. 
 
Features of VAT 
 
This section included an open question in respect of the purpose of VAT, and two 
questions about errors in returns; 1) ‘If you found an error in your returns after you had 
submitted them, would you bring this to the attention of the tax authorities’ (yes/no) and   
2) ‘If you have ever made an error on a VAT return, why do you think it occurred?’ 
 
Declaring VAT 
 
To measure attitude to VAT evasion the question read ‘VAT evasion is ...’ (five point scale 
‘wrong’ to ‘acceptable’). Another question asked ‘How often over the past five years have 
you been involved in cash transactions so as to reduce VAT payments?  
(very often/often/sometimes/rarely/never). A social norm measure asked ‘If my friends 
knew that I sometimes underdeclared VAT they would say this was ...’ (very 
wrong/wrong/irresponsible/unwise/normal/a good thing). The final question in this section 
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asked ‘If you had the opportunity to pay less VAT than you should do and you believed 
that there was absolutely no chance of getting caught, would you do so?’ 
(certainly/probably/probably not/certainly not).  
 
Some imaginary situations 
 
Two hypothetical situations were presented, one concerning the introduction of a reward 
system for paying VAT promptly, the other concerning reactions to a normal supplier 
offering to deliver some goods/services without charging VAT. 
 
Procedure 
 
A questionnaire was sent to each sample business with a covering letter stating that we 
were interested in business people’s views about VAT issues and related matters. The letter 
informed them that their business had been selected as part of a representative sample and 
that any information given would be anonymous and confidential. Participants were also 
offered the opportunity of receiving a brief report on the findings and a reply card was 
enclosed which had to be returned separately from the completed questionnaire if they 
wished to receive a report. A freepost envelope was also included for the return of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Prior experience with research on compliance suggested that the response rate would be 
low, which raises the question of how representative the response group would be. 
Oppenheim (1992) reports that late responders to surveys tend to be similar to non-
responders, so a comparison between late and early responders gives an indication of any 
likely bias. Replies were date stamped as they arrived in order for this analysis to be carried 
out. 
 
In order to provide a further check on the representativeness of the sample, we attempted to 
maximise the return rate for a sub-set of the sample using the prompting procedure of the 
Dillman Total Design Method. The extra respondents obtained using this method were then 
compared to the original respondents to see if there was a difference between those 
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responding initially and those who required heavy prompting to reply. To this end 52 
businesses were randomly selected and targeted using Dillman’s (1978) method. This 
involved annotating their freepost reply envelope by individually allocating a mix of 
traceable initial letters of the addressee and the presence or absence of full stops after the 
initials. After a period of 16 days this sub-group was sent another questionnaire and 
covering letter which reminded them of the previous correspondence and asked them to 
give up ten minutes of their time to complete and return the questionnaire. When another 
10 days had passed the ‘late response’ group was sent another questionnaire and covering 
letter by recorded delivery. 
 
Results 
 
The main body of results is divided into two main sections. The first section will deal with 
the descriptive aspect of the data and the second section will deal with the prediction of 
compliance.  
 
Representativeness checks 
 
Of the 52 businesses in the ‘Dillman’ group, 10 returned within 18 days, and were 
therefore excluded from this special group. Of the remaining forty two, 24 returned 
questionnaires as a result of further prompting. No significant differences emerged between 
the ‘Dillman’ sample and the main sample or between the late responders and early 
responders. 
 
Response rate 
 
The final number of questionnaires received was 359. This equates to a crude response rate 
of 11%. However, annual deregistration rates for newly registered businesses are 20% and 
for established business 15% and so, given that the questionnaire was distributed in 
Jan/Feb 1998, it is likely that approximately 520 of the businesses on the address file are 
unlikely to be active. The final response rate is more accurately assessed at 13.5%. Most of 
the questionnaires were completed to a high standard. However, where the total numbers 
do not equate to 359 or 100%, this is due to missing data. 
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Differences between business types 
 
There were no significant differences in self-reported compliance between the two types of 
businesses. However those in the catering business were more likely to believe fraud was 
widespread in their line of business (t = 2.08, df = 304, p < 0.05), were less likely to 
believe that people were honest (t = 3.36, df = 304, p < 0.001) and were more likely to 
believe that underdeclaring VAT could contribute to increased profits (t = 3.25, df = 307,  
p < 0.001). They were also more egoistic (t = 2.02, df = 311, p < 0.05). 
 
Section 1: Descriptive data  
 
General information 
 
Two hundred and sixty-three (73%) of the respondents were male and 87 (24%) were 
female. Ages ranged from under thirty to over sixty, with 83% (N = 297) of people being 
between the ages of 31 and 60. As expected, most businesses described themselves as 
being either in the catering trade (N = 199) or the flooring/furnishing trade (N = 117) but a 
minority of replies (N = 30) did not fit either of these categories and were coded as ‘other’. 
Some of the ‘other’ group may well have been in the catering or flooring/furnishing 
businesses but responses such as ‘company director’ or ‘all aspects of my business’ could 
not be so classified. Some respondents, however, clearly fell outside the expected 
categories, for example, ‘hairdresser’. The majority of businesses (N = 186, 52%) 
employed between one and five members of staff, 86% of businesses employed between 
one and twenty members of staff.  
 
The number of years registered for VAT ranged from one to twenty-five with an average of 
11.5 years. Forty-one percent of the sample (N = 149) employed an outside advisor to do 
VAT work. Thirty-three percent (N = 118) of the respondents had been penalised for late 
payment of VAT monies owed and 31 (9%) of the respondents stated that they regularly 
received repayments rather than paying VAT monies to the tax authorities. Respondents 
were asked how many inspections they had had and this information used to construct a 
code based on the frequency of inspection, for example, ‘Infrequent’ (less than every eight 
years); ‘Normal’ (every three to seven years); and ‘Frequent’ (every second year or more). 
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If the business had been registered for four years or less and had not had any inspections it 
was not allocated a code. Twenty-two percent (N = 80) were coded as infrequent, 53%     
(N = 191) as normal and 10% (N = 35) as frequent. 
 
One open question asked respondents to list up to three powers they thought the relevant 
tax authority (HM Customs & Excise) had. Responses were coded into eighteen categories. 
The top six categories were inspection (mentioned by 150 respondents), entry and or search 
(N = 144), fine (N = 125), seizure of goods (N = 69), legal action (N = 60), close business 
down (N = 55). 
 
Responses to the open question on the consequences of unintentional underdeclaration of 
VAT were coded as either a ‘punitive’ response, for example, fine, or ‘reasonable’ 
response, for example, asked to pay the money back. Respondents were fairly evenly split: 
43% (N = 153) believed that there would be some form of punishment, with the majority of 
these stating that a financial penalty would be incurred.  
 
You, the tax authorities and VAT 
 
Respondents felt that the tax authorities were courteous (N = 203 - 57% agreeing with 
this), efficient (only 52 - 14% respondents felt that they dealt with their business 
inefficiently) but inflexible (only 78 - 22% of respondents believed them to be flexible). 
 
The majority of respondents (N = 190, 53%) did not appear to think that VAT is levied 
fairly over the whole range of businesses. Only 73 (20%) of the respondents agreed that it 
was fair, the remainder took the neutral (middle) option. There was also a strong consensus 
that small businesses carry an unfair VAT burden. Two hundred and sixty-two (73%) of 
the respondents thought that the small business burden was unfair. Only 37 (10%) 
disagreed that the burden was unfair. Most people seemed to be unsure of the incidence of 
fraud in their own line of business with 150 (42%) taking the neutral (middle) option. Two 
hundred and three (56%) people agreed (4 and 5 on scale) that VAT is reasonably 
straightforward in their line of business. However a significant number 94 (26%) disagreed 
(1 and 2 on scale). 
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When asked ‘when I send off my cheque to the tax authorities I think of the money as 
coming from my business funds’ a large proportion agreed (N = 236, 66%; 4 and 5 on 
scale). Only 72 (20%) disagreed that they thought of the VAT as coming from their 
business funds. Many people (N = 174, 49%) did agree that there are advantages to being 
registered for VAT however 115 (32%) did not agree. 
 
You and other people 
 
The egoism scale had a mean score of 30.3 with an alpha coefficient of 0.83. 
 
You and VAT compliance 
 
Most people (N = 190, 53%) agreed that people in their line of business understand how 
VAT works and that it is time-consuming to ensure that VAT returns are done properly   
(N = 232, 65%). There was a strong feeling that mistakes are easily made on VAT returns 
(N = 249, 70% expressed this view). Many agreed that VAT rules were acceptable           
(N = 162, 45%) and that people in their line of business are generally honest when it comes 
to VAT (34% being neutral, 46% agreeing). There was a consensus that inspectors are 
good at detecting errors in the VAT returns (N = 272, 76% agreed) and that if a business is 
caught evading VAT it would get a heavy fine (N = 295, 82% agreed). There was some 
agreement that a businessman’s reputation would suffer if he was discovered to have 
underdeclared VAT (N = 181, 50% agreed and only N = 77, 21% disagreed). 
 
There was much less certainty on other questions, with the largest proportion opting for the 
middle (neutral) option. Most were uncertain about whether it was costly to operate a VAT 
fiddling scheme (N = 219, 61%) and this may suggest that these people have either never 
given it any thought or that they have never engaged in such behaviour and thus felt unable 
to give an opinion. Likewise they were unsure as to whether underdeclaring can 
substantially contribute to business profit, whether it was easy to spot competitors not 
paying VAT properly and whether a business not paying VAT properly would soon find 
itself reported to the tax authorities by other businesses. Some respondents seemed unsure 
as to whether the authorities inspect frequently and keep a close eye on all businesses with 
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119 (33%) taking the middle option. There were roughly equal amounts of people agreeing 
and disagreeing. Although a large proportion of the respondents took the middle option 
indicating that they are unsure if those businesses that are suspected of underdeclaring 
VAT are inspected far more often than those following the rules, there is a strong bias 
towards agreement with 187 (52%) agreeing and only 35 (10%) disagreeing.  
 
Respondents differed in their views as to whether the authorities would impose a penalty if 
they found an error, however small: 93 (26%) took the middle option; 141 (39%) 
respondents agreed and 122 (34%) disagreed. 
 
Features of VAT 
 
The responses to the open question on the purpose of VAT were coded into six categories 
as follows with results: 1) general taxation fund (the correct answer), N = 211 (59%);       
2) European funding, N = 18 (5%) ; 3) tax administration costs, N = 17 (5%); 4) derogatory 
comments aimed at government mismanagement, N = 18 (5%); 5) don’t know, N = 40 
(11%); 6) other, N = 19 (5%). Three hundred and four (85%) of the respondents said that if 
they found an error in their returns after they had submitted them, they would bring it to the 
attention of the authorities. 
 
Respondents were asked to state why they had made errors on past returns. The commonest 
responses were ‘insufficient care due to time pressures’ (N = 112) and ‘insufficient 
knowledge of a particular area’ (N = 89). Seventy-four respondents claimed that they had 
never made an error to their knowledge. Only seven admitted making an error out of a 
desire to reduce liability. 
 
Views on underdeclaration of VAT 
 
The vast majority of respondents (N = 262, 73%) thought that evasion is wrong. A few 
people (N = 57, 16%) chose options 2 and 3 suggesting that they did not hold strong 
convictions as to the wrongful nature of VAT evasion. Very few people (N = 15), however, 
viewed evasion as acceptable. Although 188 (52%) of the respondents claimed they have 
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never been involved in cash transactions so as to reduce VAT, 159 (44%) admitted to 
having done so at some time in the past though most (N = 102) said that this had happened 
rarely. 
 
Two hundred and five (57%) of the respondents said that if their friends believed they 
sometimes underdeclared VAT they would believe it was either ‘unwise’ or ‘normal’. Only 
87 (24%) said that their friends would say it was ‘very wrong’ or ‘wrong’. The remainder 
said either ‘irresponsible’ (N = 33, 9%) or ‘a good thing’ (N = 18, 5%). One hundred and 
forty (39%) of the respondents said that if they had the opportunity to pay less VAT and 
they believed there was absolutely no chance of getting caught they would either ‘certainly’ 
or ‘probably’ do so. Two hundred and six (57%) said that they would either ‘probably not’ 
or ‘certainly not’ do so.  
 
Some imaginary situations 
 
One hypothetical question (see ‘some imaginary situations’, Method section) sought to 
measure the influence of inspections on compliance. The majority of respondents said they 
would not engage in the fraudulent scheme anyway (N = 258, 72%). The remainder agreed 
that: ‘whether I would do it or not would depend on things other than inspections’ (N = 42, 
12%); ‘I would be less likely to do this knowing that inspections were being carried out’  
(N = 14, 4%); ‘I would certainly be less likely to do this knowing that inspections were 
being carried out’ (N = 27, 8%). 
 
Section 2: The prediction of non-compliance  
 
Dependent measure 
 
A number of questions address the issue of non-compliance, and we have combined them 
in order to construct an optimal dependent non-compliance self-report measure. This was 
done by means of homogeneity analysis using HOMALS (Van de Geer, 1993a; 1993b). 
Homogeneity analysis is a form of non-metric multidimensional scaling and can be seen as 
a generalisation of principal component analysis, allowing for non-interval variates that are 
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non-linearly transformed during the process. The homogeneity analysis was carried out in a 
number of steps: 
 
First we entered a set of 12 variates that could be seen as indicators of non-compliance and 
used the original answer categories. The analysis revealed an interpretable first dimension 
of compliance-non-compliance. However, this analysis also showed that a number of 
variates did not covary with the others, and so these were removed from further analyses; 
moreover, as homogeneity analysis is sensitive to variables with answer categories with 
few responses, some answer categories were subsequently grouped together. Non-
compliance is also very skewed, but could not be grouped further as it has only two 
categories anyway. 
 
The second analysis shows the non-compliance-dimension again as first dimension, while a 
second dimension was uninterpretable. Variates that had no clear relevance on the first 
dimension were therefore omitted and the one-dimensional solution used. 
 
The final one dimensional solution used the variates: 
[HQ1] ‘if you have ever made an error on a VAT-return, why do you think it occurred’, 
with answer categories: ‘wilful attempt for evasion’, ‘other’; 
 
[HQ2] ‘how often in the past five years have you been involved in cash transactions so as 
to reduce VAT’, with answer categories: ‘(very) often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’, ‘never’; 
 
[HQ3] ‘if you had the opportunities to pay less VAT than you should do and you believed 
that there was absolutely no chance of getting caught, would you do so’, with answer 
categories: ‘certainly’, ‘probably’, ‘probably not’, ‘certainly not’; 
 
[HQ4] the second ‘imaginary situation’ to engage in a questionable trade deal concerning 
VAT irregularities, with answer categories: ‘won’t do it anyway’, ‘dependent on 
circumstances other than C&E-inspection density’, ‘(strongly) dependent on C&E-
inspection density’;  
 14
[HQ5] ‘VAT-fraud is widespread in my line of business’, with answer categories: 1 – 5 
(strongly disagree – strongly agree). 
 
Order restrictions are satisfied for all variates. The category quantifications differed 
considerably for some variates. Heavy weights in the ‘non-compliance’ direction are 
applicable for those who admit evasion, and those who often enter into cash transactions 
for VAT reasons. Less heavy weights are associated with agreeing that VAT fraud is 
widespread, or imagining seizing the opportunity when no risk was present, or admitting 
that inspection density determines whether to engage in questionable VAT-deals. The 
heaviest weight in the ‘compliance’ direction is associated with the answer that one would 
not undertake VAT fraud even if there was no risk of being caught. 
 
HOMALS computes a score for the first dimension for each individual, but this is not 
particularly transparent. However, it is straightforward to compute an approximation that 
makes it easier for the reader to follow what is happening. An index was constructed by 
allotting the following points: four points for answering ‘wilful attempt’ on HQ1, three 
points for answering ‘(very) often’ on HQ2, one point for answering ‘sometimes’ on HQ2, 
one point for answering ‘certainly’ on HQ3, one point when not answering ‘won't do it 
anyway’ on HQ4, one point when answering 4 or 5 (agree/strongly agree) on HQ5, and 
then summing up. 
 
The resulting compliance score is very highly correlated with the HOMALS score             
(r = 0.91). After the points had been totalled this produced 171 (48%) of respondents with 
a score of zero; one hundred (28%) with a score of one and fifty-four (15%) with a score of 
between two and ten. The respondents scoring two or more were placed into a single 
category making a total of three groups. To further contrast the groups into self-reported 
non-compliers and self-reported compliers only those with a score of zero (compliers) or 
two (non-compliers) were used for analysis. By removing the non consistent group it is 
thought that the resulting measure would be better able to contrast compliers and          
non-compliers. The dependent measure had a final count of 171 compliers and 54 non-
compliers. 
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Variables that predict self-reported compliance 
 
Where possible the variables were tested to see if a scale of items could be constructed as 
such scales are generally more reliable than single item measures. The self-serving scale is 
an existing scale and was thus used as such. One other scale and one two item measure 
emerged from the data. The scale has been entitled ‘Quality of service’4 and the two item 
measure has been entitled ‘Equity’5. All the remaining variables are single item measures. 
The ‘purpose’ variable has been recoded into responders who believed that VAT is a 
general taxation and those who believed it has another (specific) purpose, however, those 
making a derogatory comment have been removed as these comments usually implied that 
the purpose was general and that all taxation was mismanaged. 
 
Each variable (single item, correlation or scale) was independently analysed using a t-test 
or chi-squared and the variables that proved to be significant in explaining differences in 
self-reported compliance behaviour are listed below. We added the qualified effect size of 
the difference according to Cohen (1977). The effect size is defined as the absolute value 
of the difference between the two means compared over the average standard deviations. 
Cohen deems a difference large if effect size is larger than 0.8, moderate if it is between 
0.5 and 0.8, small if it is between 0.2 and 0.5, negligible if it is smaller than 0.2.           
Table 1 presents all the variables on which the two groups differ significantly. This shows 
that compliers were older than non-compliers. They also wrote their books up more 
frequently, were more likely to have sought advice, rated quality of service higher than 
non-compliers and had stronger beliefs that VAT was equitable. They were more 
community oriented (less egoistic) than non-compliers, were more likely to believe that 
everybody in their line of business understands how VAT works, were less likely to believe 
that underdeclaration can substantially contribute to profit and more likely to say that 
business people generally find VAT rules acceptable. They were more likely to believe that 
                                            
4 This variable consists of five independent variables as follows: The service I receive from Customs & 
Excise is courteous; Customs & Excise are flexible in the way they deal with businesses; Customs & Excise 
deals with my business efficiently; As it stands, VAT is reasonably straightforward in my line of business; 
There are advantages in being a VAT registered business. The mean score was 16.1 and Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient for the scale was 0.71 which indicates a good scale homogeneity. 
5The equity variable consisted of two variables: ‘VAT is levied fairly over the whole range of businesses’ and 
‘Small business carry an unfair burden when it comes to VAT’ (r = 0.26, p < 0.001).  
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Table 1: Summary of first order differences between compliers and non-compliers. 
Only differences significant at at least the 0.05 level are shown 
 
     Non-
compliers 
Compliers  
Variable t 2 d.f. p < mean SD mean SD effect 
size 
Underdeclaring contributes 
to profit 
-7.08  221 0.001 3.87 1.1 2.47 1.4 1.12 
Egoism -5.94  222 0.001 35.91 8.8 28.11 8.3 0.91 
Attitude to evasion -5.65  213 0.001 2.02 1.2 1.24 0.71 0.81 
What friends say -5.08  217 0.001 4.36 1.2 3.26 1.4 0.85 
Quality of service 3.87  223 0.001 14.31 3.9 16.61 3.8 0.60 
VAT rules acceptable 3.05  223 0.005 2.83 1.2 3.36 1.1 0.46 
Equity 2.98  222 0.005 3.69 1.6 4.56 1.9 0.50 
Reputation 2.81  221 0.01 3.17 1.3 3.71 1.2 0.43 
Age 2.48  222 0.05 2.42 0.81 2.72 0.73 0.39 
Understand how VAT 
works 
2.46  222 0.05 2.94 1.3 3.42 1.2 0.38 
Reported by other 
businesses 
2.26  222 0.05 2.33 1.1 2.72 1.1 0.35 
Penalty for errors -2.25  223 0.05 3.28 1.4 2.83 1.3 0.33 
Books written up -2.05  222 0.05 2.53 1.1 2.20 0.98 0.31 
Purpose  4.67 1 0.05      
Advice sought  9.30 1 0.005      
 
 
a business not paying VAT properly would soon find itself reported to the authorities by 
other businesses and less likely to believe that if the tax authorities found an error, however 
small, they would be certain to impose a penalty. They were also more likely to believe that 
a businessman’s reputation would suffer if he was discovered to have underdeclared VAT. 
Compliers were more likely to believe that VAT is a source of general taxation revenue, 
that VAT evasion is wrong and that their friends would have a more negative attitude if 
they underdeclared VAT. 
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Multivariate analysis for self-reported compliance  
 
To test the extent to which all of the significant variables taken together can explain 
compliance behaviour the data were analysed by forward-step logistic regression. Results 
show that the final model of five variables can correctly classify 84% of respondents. Each 
of these variables is also independently significant (see Table 2). Thus, if we knew that a  
 
Table 2: Results of logistic regression analysis on the two compliance groups 
 
Variable % cases 
classified 
Chi Squared N 
 correctly Model Improvement  
Underdeclaration leads 
to profit 
76.6 34.45*** 34.45*** 198 
What friends say 82.8 50.71*** 16.26** 198 
Egoism 84.3 60.43*** 9.71* 198 
Attitude to evasion 83.3 65.50*** 5.07* 198 
Purpose of VAT 84.3 70.46*** 4.61* 198 
 
 
person believed that underdeclaring profits could substantially contribute to profits, that 
they believed their friends to be relatively undisapproving if they sometimes underdeclared 
VAT, that they had an egoistic personality, a positive attitude to evasion and believed that 
VAT had a specific purpose, we could say, with a good degree of certainty, that these 
people are non-compliers. 
 
Discussion 
 
Though these results are valuable, there are two obvious threats to the validity and 
generalisability of the findings. First the response rate is poor and this raises concerns 
about the representativeness of the sample. Second, as all of our measures rely upon self-
report and we are dealing with sensitive issues, one needs to consider how valid the 
responses are. We believe that the similarity in responses of the late- and early- responders 
suggests that the sample is reasonably representative of VAT registered catering and 
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flooring/furniture businesses in the United Kingdom as a whole. We also believe that the 
anonymity afforded people in this study means that the responses given are generally valid. 
Studies in related areas (for example, black labour market participation - Kazemier & Van 
Eck, 1992) show that questionnaire surveys lead to only a slight to moderate underestimate 
of the incidence of illegal behaviours. Whilst some of the respondents may well have 
minimised their participation in VAT evasion and that the self-report measures are not 
perfect, we are confident that the non-compliant group is more non-compliant than the 
compliant group. From a methodological point of view it is encouraging that adding a 
number of compliance-related (but less sensitive) questions to the single straightforward 
self-report question produces an index which turns out to be predictable from our 
independent measures. 
 
The comments from the open question asking respondents to list up to three powers that 
the relevant tax authority (HM Customs & Excise) have, show that people correctly believe 
them to be a very powerful body. Although the most reported power was ‘inspection’ the 
next most reported powers (that is, entry/search; fines; seizure of goods; legal action; 
power to bankrupt) all show the extent of the respondents’ beliefs about their power. Those 
running small businesses generally do believe that non-compliers will come to the attention 
of the authorities and that the authorities are good at detecting errors and are likely to 
impose penalties for transgressions. However, none of the variables measuring perceived 
detection and punishment, except for ‘businesses not paying properly would soon find 
themselves reported’, differed significantly between compliers and non-compliers. 
Interestingly, compliers were less likely to believe that errors (however small) would be 
penalised even though they believed sanctions to be tougher against evasion. Thus, it 
would seem that compliers view the authorities as less authoritarian than non-compliers. 
 
Reducing non-compliance is not, however, solely a matter of legal deterrence. A large 
proportion of people agreed that a businessman’s reputation would suffer if he were 
discovered to have underdeclared VAT. This was also a significant variable between the 
compliant and non-compliant groups. This may mean that non-compliers believe that being 
caught evading would not have any affect on, not only his reputation, but also his business 
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success. In reality this is unlikely, as few people would agree that being caught in an illegal 
act would not be viewed by many of the public, and thus customers, in a negative light. If 
underdeclaring VAT were to be made more public by reporting incidents of fraud (with 
names) in the press it is likely that the reality of damaging a businessman’s reputation was 
indeed perceived as detrimental. 
 
The discussion so far has been concerned with ways of discouraging non-compliers. 
However, there is a fine balance here. This sample of small business people is generally 
honest and where non-compliance has been admitted, for the most part, it is a rare 
occurrence. Many of the respondents, however, do not seem to be sure about the incidence 
of fraud and this could be worrying as it raises the question of perceived equity and what 
steps people may take to redress the balance. This concept of equity is known as ‘social 
comparison equity’ and is well documented in the literature as a factor influencing 
compliance (see Cowell, 1992). As it is known that people do seem to look to their 
reference group and take action against a system to balance the equation, whereby it seems 
fair to the individual, there is clearly an educational role for the authorities to inform 
people that in fact the population seem to be generally honest and that fraud is not 
widespread. Thus, while informing the public that they are tough on non-compliers they 
should also inform them that most people are honest and that VAT fraud is uncommon.  
 
Most people view evasion as wrong and the fact that some people believe non-compliance 
to be wrong and still admit to occasionally engaging in it is not an uncommon finding in 
taxation and other rule-breaking research. There may be a number of reasons for this, but a 
motivator to act against one’s beliefs in this instance is likely, once again, to be a desire to 
create equity in the system. The fairness of the system is a significant factor in the 
predictive analysis between the two groups. What would appear to be important is the 
perceived unfair burden carried by small businesses. A large proportion of business people 
think that the VAT system is unfair towards small businesses. Previous research (Adams & 
Webley, 2001 suggests it is likely to be two prominent factors: first, the cost and effort of 
collecting the tax, and second, that small businesses do not have the resources to minimise 
the impact of VAT by employing experts to make use of loop-holes. Thus, if the tax 
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authorities could be seen to be closing down loopholes, this may create a more evenly 
balanced perception of the VAT system in the minds of small businessmen and women. To 
overcome the objections as to the costs of collecting VAT one possible way would be to 
reward business people for the collection. 
 
As with much other rule-breaking behaviour, VAT compliance is influenced by social 
norms. The fact that non-compliers are more likely to say their friends would tolerate 
evasion is unsurprising. Smith and Kinsey (1987) found in investigating income tax 
evasion, that people's social networks help shape perceptions, norms and attitudes and can 
and do influence behaviour. Furthermore, Paternoster et al., (1983) have also found that 
social disapproval by significant others has an inverse effect on illegal behaviour. What we 
can not ascertain here is whether the respondents have indeed discussed the matter with 
their friends (though what little evidence there is suggests that discussing such matters is 
unlikely - Sigala, Burgoyne & Webley, 1999) or if there is just a commonly held belief that 
other people (including friends) tolerate fraud, perhaps because they may be engaging in it. 
If this is the case, once again an educational role, whereby the tax authorities inform their 
clients that most people do think that evasion is wrong and are generally honest may help 
reduce non-compliance. 
 
Literature on how a person rates the service of an official body is thin on the ground, 
however, Adams (1996) and Van Giels and Elffers (1998) showed that how tax authorities 
behaved towards their clients does matter and this research confirms this. The general 
standard of service was highly rated by many, especially in respect of efficiency and 
courtesy. This was also a significant predictor of non-compliance and it would certainly 
seem there would be a pay-off in ensuring that high standards of service are maintained and 
even improved. Compliers were also more likely to find the rules acceptable, thus if it 
could be established what exactly non-compliers object to and a way were found to make 
the rules more acceptable to this group this may also have a positive affect. Interestingly, 
non-compliers were also less likely to believe that the rules were understood, and whilst 
this question was projective in nature, it may well be an indicator of their level of 
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understanding, providing another opportunity for the tax authorities to reinforce their 
advisory role and become more accessible to small businesses. 
 
The findings for personality differences between compliers and non-compliers is now well 
documented in social psychological literature. Much recent rule-breaking work has shown 
that these personality differences do exist and do influence compliance (see Adams & 
Webley, 1996). However, there would seem to be little to be done as these traits are likely 
to be deep-rooted and not responsive to change. Indeed, the egoistic individuals identified 
in this study are also likely to be rule-breakers in other contexts. These findings for the 
personality differences highlight the ‘social dilemma’ nature of any taxation compliance. In 
social dilemmas people are faced with a conflict between the pursuit of their own 
individual outcomes. Non-compliance implies individual gain at some cost to others, 
whilst compliance implies gain to others at some cost to oneself. If, however, egoistic 
individuals could be assisted to reduce the conflict by helping them to perceive that they 
may benefit from VAT, this may reduce non-compliance. The people in this study who 
erroneously believed that VAT had a purpose such as European funding or funding 
administrative costs were significantly more likely to be non-compliant. Thus, they may 
become more favourable to VAT if they understood its general nature. 
 
In an earlier qualitative study (Adams & Webley, 2001) differences were found between 
the catering trade and the flooring/furnishing trade. Similarly in this study some differences 
have been found. For example, catering businesses believed fraud to be more widespread 
and also believed that people are less honest in their line of business. There were also some 
differences in areas that separate compliers from non-compliers. For instance, the 
flooring/furnishing businesses believed the VAT system to be more equitable and the rules 
more acceptable. However, these differences do not appear to be robust enough to 
influence compliance and thus we have been unable to find clear evidence that the two 
groups differ significantly in levels of compliance. Also, mental accounting was not a 
significant predictor of compliance. It could of course be that it does not matter if people 
think of the VAT monies they collect as coming from their business, however, this is the 
first time this concept has been addressed in taxation research it would seem premature to 
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reach such a conclusion. The most striking finding in respect of mental accounting is the 
high level of people who ‘strongly agreed’ that the money is viewed as their part of their 
business funds. It may well be that the measure was not sensitive enough for the sample 
used and future research would need to refine it.  
 
Younger respondents were more likely to be non-compliant and, as Adams and Webley 
(1996) have argued in other contexts, this is more likely to be a cohort effect, whereby 
people are generally becoming less respectful of the law and official bodies, than an age 
effect. This strongly argues for measures to be taken which break down some of the ‘them 
and us’ barriers between the authorities and people running small businesses with steps 
taken to create a more mutual working climate. The fact that compliers were more likely to 
have sought advice suggests that perceiving the authorities as supportive may improve 
compliance. The fact that non-compliers write their books up less frequently than 
compliers raises the question of whether this is done to facilitate fraudulent entries. 
Alternately, it may just be that these people are inherently less organised and that the last 
minute urgency required to undertake weeks or months of the necessary accounting 
required results in negative feeling towards the authorities and the paying of VAT, thus 
leading to non-compliance. If this is the case, Customs & Excise could try and encourage 
these people to see the benefits of keeping their books in order on a daily basis.  
 
All five important predictor variables have, bar one, all been discussed. The belief that 
underdeclaring VAT can substantially contribute to profit needs little explanation, for 
without the belief there would be little point in engaging in, what is in fact, risky 
behaviour. What is likely to differ is not only the level of belief that underdeclared funds 
will increase profit, but also how much risk is perceived by the individual, as any profits to 
be gained will be offset by penalties imposed.  
 
Overall, the message would seem to be that VAT payers, and non-compliers in particular, 
need to change the way that they perceive the tax authorities. They could be helped by the 
adoption of a more positive attitude by the latter through an emphasis placed on the 
advisory role and by a general education or reeducation of the true nature and purpose of 
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VAT and by making people aware that most VAT payers are honest. A more mutual 
working climate is likely to prove of benefit to both parties. However, it would also be 
prudent to reinforce the costs of non-compliance whilst emphasising how the system 
ensures fairness. This would serve as reassurance for existing compliers and as a warning 
to non-compliers.  
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